Stare Decisis in Islamic Law

Ali at eteraz.org takes on Ijma’a, one of the primary sources of Islamic Law, best defined as the consensus of legal opinion. He raises many probing questions and pragmatically observes that

…in a Muslim country, the ijma of scholars means nothing unless the GOVERNMENT OF THAT COUNTRY is willing to execute their consensus. If a government doesn’t manifest the consensus, it matters nothing what the scholars are consensing about.

I have few thoughts to share regarding this entry.

For that matter, which source of Islamic law matters if state is unwilling to apply the injuntions deduced from it? The injunctions explicitly derived from Quran and Sunnah do not matter equally in terms of their meaningfullness vis-à-vis socio-political philosophy if a Muslim state procrastinates in confusion or do not feel it pragmatic to execute. Therefore the problem Ali poses may as well be expanded to engage all the other sources of Islamic law.

Having said that, I would add that it would probably amount to oversimplification if we think it sufficient to assume that Ijma’a is just a ‘consensus of scholars’ in the paradigm of traditional Islamic law throughout history. In my humble opinion, most of the questions Ali asked would boil down to ‘definition’ of a particular source (in this case Ijma’a) rather than its ‘application’. Definitions, as a matter of fact, do not remain absolute and may evolve and undergo reform in terms of making sense of the law which constitutes them in a particular time. Albeit some of us may yawn when others look at history of institutions, It would not be entirely wasteful to argue that understanding history of the development of law is a pre-requisite for any meaningful reform.

Shafii’s famous comment (in Kitab al-Umm) to counter his opponents that

What you possess is not Ijma’a (agreement) but iftiraaq (disagreement)…

is enough to suggest that Ijma’a is probably the most disagreed upon source of Islamic law. The disagreement, most of the times, is so harsh that many jurists (for instance al-Nazzam al Basri, the famous teacher of al-Jahiz) have explicitly denied it as a binding source. Those who consider it binding define it in different ways, continue dividing it into various types (e.g. explicit and tacit Ijma’a) and sometimes consider its inter-dependence with other sources. Malik, for instance, refers to the agreed practice of Madinites as al-amr al mujtamaah alaiyh, calls it a binding consensus and includes it in primary sources of Sunnah. Ahmed ibn Hanbal, on the other hand, regards anyone who claims a complete consensus of legal opinion as a liar but considers the consensus of Companions of Prophet as binding for later generations. Almost similar opinions have been related by Ibn Hazm, Ibn Taymiah and Shaukani. Shafii limits Ijma’a to such basic injunctions as obligation of five prayers, number of raka’ahs and obligation to perform hajj etc.

Most of the questions about nature, sources and jurisdiction of Ijma’a have already been asked by the classical jurists and discussed adequately by many of the contemporary scholars. There are two important facts that come forth if we analyse the gist of all these classical positions on nature of Ijma’a and its various claims throughout history. 1) Majority of classical jurists agree that for any consensus to become binding, there must exists an evidence (Sanad) from other sources and 2) Most of them find it practically impossible to know the positions held by entirety of scholars as they are scattered all over the world (as evident by the famous debate between Layth and Malik). Both these facts serve as limiting factors towards any possibility of establishment and claim of consensus upon a legal opinion. While the former limits the possibility of personal or state sponsered opinions becoming binding on collectivity of Muslims, the latter substantially limits the jurisdiction of Ijma’a by reducing it to very basic injunctions already derived from either Quran or Sunnah. The example of former is Malik’s refusal to establish Muwatta as a binding code for Muslims of all lands and the latter led Ahmed bin Hanbal and Shafii to reach their respective positions.

These jurists, in their times, were no less reformists, desperately wanting consistency and methodology in application of Islamic law thereby striving to achieve congruence between Islamic methodology and socio-political philosophy of their times. Few contemporary scholars that I have studied in detail and who are well-versed with the development of Islamic law, have dealt with an ever-important issue of defining sources in Islamic Law. Javed Ahmed Ghamdi, for instance, having been fully aware of the history of development of Islamic law, does not consider Ijma’a as one of the sources of Sharia’h. “There is no way to know that a consensus has happened about a legal opinion”, one of his students argues; precisely the problem that Shafii and Ahmed bin Hanbal raised in their times.

The bottom line is: The only way to reform Islamic law, so that it is completely reconciled with the modern political and social philsophy, is to figure out how our predecessors did it in the past.

The objective is indeed difficult and obviously requires contemporary scholars to once again (re)define categories of Islamic legal archetypes. A quick solution to the problem may be to understand binding of Ijma’a as demanding subordination to a rule upheld collectively by the highest legal forum of the land. Islamic tradition, in early stages, had already seen such a forum being confined to jurist Companions and later to the theoretical collectivity of independant jurists. In terms of English common law, it is something close to the doctrine of stare decisis and may well be the adherence of lower courts to the precedents set by full bench of the highest court in a Muslim country. It is needless to say that such precedents should be based upon workable Islamic theories of legislation, adjudication and compliance.

Filed under: Criticism & Comments, Ilm al-Ikhtilaf, Traditional Islam

Motive is the Primary Prerequisite

The ever hyped question of evolution of Islamic law has recently been reiterated in one of the leading local newspapers. The writer, who is an old schoolmate, has indicated some finer points regarding the dynamics of movement in Islam while completely missing the principle issue of motive which might bring about this structural movement.

Quoting Iqbal from his Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, author contends that:

The argument being made here is not the traditionally liberal one that Islamic law being the law of a dynamic eternal religion needs to be capable of addressing the needs and concerns of evolving society and thus capable of evolving itself through ijtihad, but that the Islamic tradition is being evolved but only through the ijtihad performed by radicals, thus making it more bigoted and retrogressive.

Unless clerisy in Islamic societies, for instance Pakistan, is not ready to reconsider and analyze why they need Islamic thought to evolve so badly, criticizing radicalist agenda would seem nothing more than a meandering prattle. The liberals and progressives among these societies are not yet ready to reassociate their religious percept as it relates to political and moral philosophy in recent times. Therefore all the arguments against religious exclusivity and extremist interpretations, though accurate and true, would ultimately resonate better with logical positivism rather than a true religious discourse.

It would be sheer naivety if one disagrees with the assertion that many popular religious opinions are insinuations of hate and revenge politics rather than outcome of serious and erudite contemplation. Moreover denouncements of fellow Muslims as infidels and apostates are just quasi-legal judgments played by escapists to terminate assailable arguments. On the other hand, it is too simplistic to contend that absence of religious reform and scholarship is a primary cause of this booming radicalism. What we often fail to see is that intelligentsia in Pakistan is not ready to accept position of religion at the kernel of political, economic and social philosophy and merely insisting upon using it as a liberal nationalist’s tool to counter radical interpretations.

As a matter of fact, revolutionary transformists [sic] like Muhammad Iqbal cautioned ceaselessly about a similar pitfall:

We heartily welcome the liberal movement in modern Islam, but it must also be admitted that the appearance of liberal ideas in Islam constitutes also the most critical moment in the history of Islam. Liberalism has a tendency to act as a force of disintegration, and the race-idea which appears to be working in modern Islam with greater force than ever may ultimately wipe off the broad human outlook which Muslim people have imbibed from their religion. Further, our religious and political reformers in their zeal for liberalism may overstep the proper limits of reform in the absence of check on their youthful fervor {…} A careful reading of history shows that the Reformation was essentially a political movement, and the net result of it in Europe was a gradual displacement of the universal ethics of Christianity by systems of national ethics. {….} and then to move forward with self-control and a clear insight into the ultimate aims of Islam as a social polity.

It is interesting that statements like above can be taken either way as radical brand of Islam is also claiming the right to reform and is one of the manifestations of modernity, at least in the west. Puritanical Islamic movements, both historical and contemporary, also point us toward a bitter fact that reform and (re) interpretation can be a dangerous notion if enough groundwork is not there at the level of social and political level.

We have come about a long way since Iqbal’s times and have had enough share of enlightened and retrogressive reformists. Religious scholarship, no matter how much rigorous and enlightened, would ultimately fail to deliver if religious thought does not get the central and governing place in society. Talking about extrapolation of moral principles in Quran, applying them to our lives in an idealized culture of proverbial tolerance and enabling people to criticize different brands of Islam is jumping to the method before achieving decisive consensus regarding the motive.

Filed under: Criticism & Comments, Islam & Modernity, Land of the 'Pure', Traditional Islam

Pope should not waste time reading all the people who wrote about Ibn Hazm; he should instead read Ibn Hazm.

If Pope’s evidence (the famous 14th century dialogue) to beef up his argument against Islam being a violent religion was fragile, flimsier was this allusion that Islamic teachings defy all the inherent reason in the universe. In fact, his remarks were pathetically blatant lacking sufficient concern for historical reality and an in-depth knowledge of Muslim philosophy. After reading the text of Ratzinger’s speech quite a few times, I am still perplexed regarding the line of his reasoning; namely that faith in an absolutely transcendent God whose acts and will cannot be grasped completely by human reason can possibly lead one to conceive His images which are capricious and may be against all truth and goodness. The argument becomes further ironic as Pope strangely chooses to abduce views of a multifarious Muslim writer who can equally be classified as a quasi-liberal writer/poet, a literal jurist, a controversial philosopher, an innovative grammarian or above all a compassionate ethicist.

Even scanty readings of Ibn Hazm would fail to portray him primarily as an absolute fatalist which Joseph Ratzinger was able to do inadvertently for his Christian audience with such an ease. The intuitive reason which Ratzinger calls creative and self communicating when combined with sound human perception and understanding of language is the first and foremost source of all human knowledge according to Ibn Hazm. It was one of his earliest projects to advocate a sound system of logic so that the revealed word of God can be defended without taking refuge in circular arguments. Times right before his were famous for determining value of logic as a means for attaining absolute truth. There were debates, for instance between Christian logician Abu Bishr Matta bin Yunus and the Muslim philologist Abu Said al Sirafi in early tenth century, resolving controversies whether logic is a form of universal expression or not. Ibn Hazm wrote extensively against the holders of extreme view of man tamantaqa tazandaqa (whoever practices logic practices heresy). In reposnse to his opponents, who objected with the counter-argument that early generations of Muslims did not resort to demonstrative argumentation and proofs rooted firmly in logic, he replied that they witnessed the revelation directly and were not exposed to contrastive beliefs.

An alternate undertaking in parallel was to refute the philosophers and theologians who elevated logic to a station where it can be used independantly as a means for attaining truth thereby superceding and replacing revelation. Many consider him as a pioneer in methodological rejection of hellenistic metaphysics of that time which was voiced by many Muslim philosophers with slight shifts in semantics. Here, the Pope is partially right as Ibn Hazm advocates an unbridgeable gap between the Creator and creation. However the underlying aim in Ibn Hazm’s discourse is not to establish that human beings are not responsible for their own actions by being submitted to Divine Will but to define a supreme station for God where there is no room left for speculations. Ibn Hazm achieves this with ease as he has the revealed word of God to fall back to, and which he uses as a touchstone to establish veracity of any claim regarding His ultimate nature.

Ratzinger however speculates erroneously when he hypothesize that Ibn Hazm’s God could have done everything against the truth and virtue. Ibn Hazm does not push his God away in order to grant him more divinity (as the Pope contends) but asserts that we cannot comprehend fully the particulars of God’s wisdom and will instead remain in need of His favours always. He pits these arguments against some of the Mutizilites who were presumably in favor of basing ethics on human reasoning, even at the cost of statements in the Quran. His often misunderstood contention that God can reward evil and punish good is completely subjective as he never claimed that God in fact does so. His contentions are rooted in a constantly recurring theme that humanity always needs objectively sustainable communication from the Creator as we cannot achieve salvation through reason alone. He and his God calls it the divine mercy and love, on which depends the destiny of all creation; and that is the only real analogy as far as Ibn Hazm is concerned.

Ibn Hazm can easily be misunderstood if his different positions are not disentangled carefully. Moreover his various intellectual stances can be put forth as an evidence for contradictory assertions. He tried all his life to bridge gaps between reason and revelation and describe the human condition and thought in relation to revealed word of God. His literature is depictive of human beauty and love of God. According to Ibn Hazm, we constantly need God to reveal us who He is, why He created us and what should we do and what we should not in order to attain His pleasure. It is one of His favors that He gave us the power to reason and contemplate both within our selves and with others. However all human contemplation, cogitation and criticism should take revelation as the starting point.

******

On a different note, I completely agree with what thabet has said and do share his feelings. Pope’s speech may have been full of inaccurate assertions and misreadings of Muslim theology (kalam) yet he has asked some challenging question which should be responded satisfactorily by contemporary Muslim scholarship. His major contention is that Islamic weltanschauung incorporates violence as a valid methodology and this world view is theologically rooted in the understanding of God’s nature and character. Why should these questions invoke anger, hate and murder instead of inciting positive and objective confrontation on intellectual fronts.

Among 20+ people that I have asked in the past week, none cared to read what Pope has actually said though they were aware that he has said something very wrong. A Christian member of Pakistan’s parliament who proposed the house to ask clarification from Vatican before passing a unanimous resolution of condemnation was forced to sit in protest. No major or minor newspaper (of Pakistan) took pains to translate and publish the entire speech or even its controversial parts. However none of them failed to make a great news story out of it. Its sad that Muslims of the world seems to be a big rabble lead by the pirates of intellect. Even sadder is the realization that there is still no light at the end of the tunnel.

Filed under: Criticism & Comments, Debates & Disputes, Ilm al-Ikhtilaf, Philosophy, Scholars, Traditional Islam

Reviewing the Debate on Hudood Ordinance

If the premise was that Hudood Ordinance is problematic, the debate was a non sequitur. But it doesn’t come as a great surprise because debates and discussions are never the usual movers towards reaching conclusions in Pakistan. However this debate was not irksome like the most of the rest which we compulsively witness everyday on tv in search of a tinge of wisdom.

Javed Ahmed Ghamidi and Dr Muhammad Tufail Hashmi were teamed up to object the ordinance and its implementation and Mufti Muneeb ul Rahman and Maulana Abdul Malik were there to defend it.

The Initial Remarks:
Dr Hashmi and Mufti Muneeb were alloted 5 minutes each to make their respectives stands clear to the house. The first speaker Dr Hashmi said that the contentions of ordinance being within the injunctions of Quran and Sunnah are grossly erroneous. 81 out of its 101 clauses are not related in any way to Quran and Sunnah. These procedural clauses are subject to change by judiciary and legislature any time. The rest which are presented as hudud have been incoherently picked up from Quran & Sunnah without reflecting upon the nature of crime and criminal. As a result hundreds of women were kept in jails for years waiting for hadd to be implemented. There is a deterioration in the state of law and order as enactment of the law itself gives loopholes to misuse it. The resentment compiled over years ultimately led different groups of society to talk against the Islamic law in general.

Rather than commenting on the ordinance, Mufti Muneeb began with a protest (in his alloted time) that hearts of the people of Pakistan are deeply attached with Islam. Since no one can talk openly against the hudud due to fear of inviting strong criticism from people, they are actually trying to get the complete ordinance repealed. It is similar how many people who want to criticise Islam end up criticising the maulvi. There wont be any new revelation delineating the procedures for implementation of punishments. Experts can only comment on the errors in implementation but complete ordinance cannot be revoked. He rejected it as a propaganda that women were mistreated using the ordinance per se. He confirmed the juristic ruling that women should not be put in jails and said that taazira’at in the ordinance should be removed and made part of the Pakistan Penal Code instead. Rather than discussing the ambiguities related to zina bil raza (adultery) and zina bil jabr (rape) in ordinance he irrelevantly went into history of Islamic law and gave an example or two that both crimes were differentiated by Islamic jurists throughout history.

[In my view, Dr Hashmi's presentation was accurate enough keeping in view the scarcity of time. His main points can be understood further in the light of his book. I dont want to be accused of pleonasm in trying to prove the absurdity of Mufti Muneeb's method of argument. As I have already said in the start, it was not a classical argument in favor of the ordinance - it was just an irrelevance indulgence into emotionalism.]

Role of Police in Implementing the Ordinance:
A movie was played showing women who were in jails since three years (and more) without evidence. The recent case proceedings of Aruna and Muazzam Ali (who were present on the occassion) were also shown. In response to moderators’ questions Aruna replied that both of them (she and her husband Muazzam) were caught by the police after an FIR was launched under hudud ordinance by her parents who said that Muazzam has kidnapped their daughter. In the courtroom magistrate didn’t pay heed to whatever she said and kept looking at her father. The overall response of judiciary was pathetic and she thought about requesting the mainstream ulema to help her.

In response to a question regarding how to resolve complications arising due to false FIRs, Maulana Abdul Malik said that police should never chase the adulterers at first place. Totally disregarding that an ambiguous ordinance adds to the complications, he put the entire blame on the system of police reminding the house that its a British system. Making this comment further absurd, he added that police should be well versant with Quran and Sunnah [thereby agreeing, though he would be unaware of this subtlety, that requisite awareness about any law may be a prerequisite of its application]. Mufti Muneeb said that Anglo-Saxon law equates FIR with a nass (reasoning from a known injunction – a valid shari’i evidence).

In response to another question whether police should record the FIR for adultery at all, Dr Hashmi said that police has no role in cases of zina bil raza. Javed Ghamidi said that police should demand four witnesses before recording the FIR and Quran is clear on this. That was perhaps the only point in the complete debate where all the panelists agreed.

The Issue of Qadhaf:
The point of concern before the house was that qadhaf (punishment for slander) in Zina Ordinance cannot be exercised unless the case is re-prosecuted. That was perhaps the best part in the complete debate in terms of mirthfulness as well as deep frustration. I present this diatribe here from my notes.

Abdul Malik: No seperate legislation should be done for qadhaf. Prophet (pbuh) applied qadhaf as well as hadd in cases of zina. Judge is a legislator as well as an implementer of law.
Mufti Muneeb: It is necessary that people like Aruna should come to judge and ask for their qisaas (retaliation) because qadhaf is a kind of qisaas.
Javed Ghamidi: No. It may not be necessary that women should come to judge as this is against their honor according to norms of our society. In addition to that its an issue of procedural law and there is nothing in Quran and Sunnah which can be used to establish that women should come to judge demanding hadd-e-qadhaf to be implemented on one who has blamed them falsely.
Tufail Hashmi: The complete ordinance of qadhaf is ambiguous. Did Ayesha (r) formally demanded the hadd-e-qadhaf. The case of Mughira bin Shu’ba (r) is another example when hadd-e-qadhaf was implemented automatically.
Javed Ghamidi: The court has all the right to exercise hadd-e-qadhaf without a formal petition.
Mufti Muneeb asks Javed Ghamidi: How can court send forces to identify people who are falsely blaming others?
Javed Ghamidi: I am talking about a specific case which is already in court and it has been proved that accuser was wrong.
Abdul Malik: Ideally a judge should be a mujtahid (an independant jurist) in limited capacity.
Javed Ghamidi: I have been stating categorically since few years now that either the requisite amendments should be made in the ordinance or the complete ordinance should be repealed.
Abdul Malik [outbursts]: He [while poiniting towards Ghamidi] is actually opining that hudud Allah should be repealed.
Javed Ghamidi: I have no doubt that implementation of hudud Allah is obligatory but the ordinance under discussion is made according to human understanding and can be repealed or amended.
Abdul Malik [shouts]: This is a conspiracy against hudud of Allah and we would never let it happen in this country.

[After that moderators intervened and sought clarification from Javed Ghamidi who re-clarified his already clarified stance which had been grasped by everyone viewing the debate except the two opposing panelists.]

Does Zina bil Jabr Invoke Hadd?
Speaking first, Javed Ahmed Ghamidi said that zina bi jabr should be dealt with under the law of hiraabah (maleficence in land) as expounded by verse 5:33. He explained that rape is a multiple crime involving adultery as well as harassment and molestation and Prophet (pbuh) himself defferentiated between both on number of occassions. Dr Hashmi said that evidence in cases of zina and zina bil jabr are different. The ayah that noble women should come out of their houses covered was specifically revealed so that they should not be a subject of sexual harrassment. He gave examples of Maliki Jurists like Qadi Iya’d and Qadi Ibn Arabi (the jurist and not the sufi) who believed that rape should be dealt with under the law of hiraabah. Mufti Muneeb disagreed and said that zina bil jabr if proved invokes rajm (stonning to death). Abdul Malik said that there is no need to do ijtihad when Quran is clear.

Amendments Proposed by Panelists:
Mufti Muneeb suggested that all the procedural clauses and punsihments which are not hudud (therefore taaziraat) should be excluded from the ordinance and made part of PPC and a qadi who is also a qualified jurist should be included in the system. There is no question of repealing the complete law. Maulana Abdul Malik said that he agrees with Mufti Muneeb and gave another emotive political statement (which has now become a trademark of MMA) that no disguised conspiracy against Hudud would be tolerated. He reiterated that police and judges should be trained according to Islam.

Javed Ghamidi quickly presented five of his main objections against the ordinance. These are:
1. Adultery should be explicitly differentiated with rape not only in terms of definition (which it does now) but in terms of procedural methods and their implementation.
2. The ordinance in its current form applies punishment according to the degree of evidence. It should be recodified to invoke punishment on presence or absense of punishment.
3. There should be no gender discrimination in the application of ordinance.
4. Cases of rape should be dealt with according to law of hiraabah.
5. Appropriate clauses should be added to the ordinance to explicate the degree of doubt that can be given for the benefit of the accused.

Dr Hashmi while agreeing with Ghamidi said that any new law should not be projected as a law of Allah so that there will always remain the room for improvement and change.

Viewing the debate was another very frustrating experiencing for me. Not because the lack of objective scholasticism on part of panelists in favour of the ordinance but lack of sense in people of media regarding how to conduct and organise such debates. First of all the title “Grand Debate on Hudood Ordinance” was a misnomer as the Ordinance of Zina was the actual topic of discussion. Not even a brief summary of the agenda was presented to educate the panelists as well as audience to avoid repetitive digression. The choice of hosts was also confusing as both were journalists specialised in political and social issues rather than discussing conflicting religious interpretations. As a result it was more of an informal discussion based on conventional wisdom rather than sources of religion and law. I still fail to find the reason why a person like Maulana Abdul Malik was invited as a panelist who just kept on nodding his head in favour of whatever Mufti Muneeb uttered. Not to mention his funny and caustic remarks against panelists on other side.The only good that can come out of such debates is the exposure of actual depth of scholarship of mainstream ulema who have more excess to people due to their politicised and emotive slogans. The in-depth scholarship is not popular enough to come out of the books and reach streets even in cases where lines of religious interpretation and social reforms crisscross. This was a indeed a good platform for people to get acquainted with faces representing religion on a different intellectual plane and for a different cause than meeting twice a year for sighting moons.

Filed under: Criticism & Comments, Debates & Disputes, Land of the 'Pure'

Whosoever changes his religion, kill him!

In a recently televised discussion, Javed Ahmed Ghamidi has clarified that his reliance on the principle of prescription of death penalty on only two occassions (al-Maidah 5:32) does not in anyway weakens any of the authentic ahadith ascribed to the Prophet(s). For instance this one narrated by Ikramah(r) and recorded by Bukhariy in his collection

Some Zanadiqa (atheists) were brought to ‘Ali and he burnt them. The news of this event, reached Ibn Abbas who said, “If I had been in his place, I would not have burnt them, as Allah’s Apostle forbade it, saying, ‘Do not punish anybody with Allah’s punishment (fire).’ I would have killed them according to the statement of Allah’s Apostle, ‘Whoever changed his (Islamic) religion, then kill him.’
(Sahih Bukhariy, Volume 9, Book 84, Number 57)

The above hadith and few others are generally understood by classical Muslim scholars as adding a third instance invoking capital punishment (i.e killing apostates). Ghamidi opines that all of these should be revisited in the light of principles established in Quran rather than adding something explicitly to the body of these principles.

He asserted that there’s no doubt in the authenticity of the ahadith in question, per se. However the application of these traditions or deductions from them are redundant in modern times even if there’s an ideal Islamic state. No one except Prophet(s) can claim the removal of all the excuse in relation to accepting the revealed truth of God Almighty, a concept which is called Itmaam al-Hujjah and therefore no one except him could implement death penalty for apostates. As he is no more amongst us, the ultimate decision would be revealed by God on the day of judgement and should be postponed as such. This right cannot be claimed by anybody after Prophet no matter how much effort is put in to present the true message of Islam.

Ghamidi’s reiteration of his position has a multidimensional importance in the overall framework of contemporary Islamic scholarship and its methodology which is currently experiencing its formative period. Firstly first it establishes that the school of Ghamidi/Islahi has dropped the sheer skepticism towards the science of hadith in general though its not among the primary sources of understanding Islam, in principle. Secondly it raises many questions regarding the pre-formative history of Muslims. For instance the concept of Itmam al-Hujjah (as understood by Ghamidi) seems anachronic in light of coarse presentation of Islam that earliest of the Muslims used to extend during their expansions.

Before I start meandering I give these bleary thoughts some time to transform into meaningful questions.

Filed under: Criticism & Comments, Hadith & Sunnah, Sociology of Religion, Traditional Islam